It isn't though, it still isn't explaining what it's like from the inside. You can give the same reductionist explanation of neurons firing to someone who doesn't feel from the inside. There's no account for the singular subjective point of view.
Could you give me a link that explains this in more detail?
The problem with the idea that qualia is incommunicable in reductive terms because of the fault of "mental model" is that it denies that we gain any knowledge in our experience of new subjective phenomena. Let's say I had never experienced blue before, yet knew every reductionist physical characteristic of blue and every brain state of when a person experiences blue. When I first experience blue, I still gain new knowledge of what it's like to experience blue despite knowing all the reductionist physical properties. From a reductionist perspective I know all the information about blue already, because I know all of it's physical properties and therefore haven't learnt anything. But that just isn't the case, when I experience blue for the first time I discover new attributes that blue has, these attributes aren't in any reductionist explanation.
I'm not sure if I understand your position, you believe there is qualia as we know it? That's contradictory to the belief that consciousness can be explained in reductive physical terms. Qualia by it's very nature is only introspectively accessible, it's the experience of our individual mental lives. If it were explained in objective reductionist physical terms how would it be qualia?
Also, what do you mean by "not an observation about the reality of things"? Are you suggesting that consciousness as "more than a sum of it's parts" isn't objectively observable so therefore not real?